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Discuss: ‘Stalemate brought about by deterrence is not real peace.’

An essay By Ben Tucker B.A. Honours Politics and International Relations Lancaster University

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence is a desperate throw in a dice game for the ultimate stakes of ‘peace’, ‘freedom’ and ‘security – winner take all. But in our saner moments most of us realise there can be no winners in this game.[1]

This essay will discuss the issues surrounding the strategic concept of deterrence theory. It is suggested that the stalemate brought about from fear of massive retaliation even after a nuclear attack has been sustained, creates an artificial peace which, at best, results in proxy or limited wars in other parts of the globe and could ultimately result in global destruction. Other writers dismiss these claims quoting historical evidence which support the counter claim that nuclear deterrence can result in a sustainable, peaceful international structure based on a balance of strategic power. Those of the realist field of thought believe that deterrence is the best chance of achieving a peace in an anarchic international system. Throughout this article we shall examine the criticisms and short comings of deterrence theory, including an examination of the human aspect of nuclear decision making, which could lead to possible misinterpretation and misjudgement ultimately resulting in a nuclear exchange. To ensure a neutral discussion we shall also look at a defence of deterrence strategy concentrating upon the realist beliefs of the state acting rationally on behalf of the state as a whole and discuss the contemporary value of deterrence strategy in light of new global dangers such as terrorism.

Those from the realist train of thought believe that the international system of states is one of anarchy, deterrence theory allows for peace despite of this anarchic environment. Neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, believe that states within the international system can be manipulated in one of two ways. Firstly, Waltz describes the ‘defensive ideal’[2] which is based upon the belief that if a state can assemble defensive forces of a formidably strength, any expected attacker would be unable to conquer them.[3] Although a strong defence can act as a deterrent it also allows for security if an attacker were to test ones defences. This is referred to by Waltz as a ‘defensive ideal’ simply because it is an idealistic situation, in reality impenetrable defences are simply unobtainable. The second way in which states can be manipulated is through nuclear deterrence. Deterrence can be defined as ‘the effect when a person, institution, or policy decides not to take action that otherwise would have been taken, because of the belief or strong suspicion that intolerable consequences would ensue from such action.’[4] Technology such as intercontinental ballistic missile systems mounted with nuclear warheads make nuclear weapons almost impossible to defend and if one believes the realist assumption, that states will act in the interest of self preservation, a state which possesses nuclear weapons with a second strike capability, the ability to launch a nuclear attack even after sustaining an similar attack, is unlikely to find itself under threat of attack. According to this deterrence theory, a peaceful international system can be achieved by the manipulation of states through threat of nuclear destruction, a nuclear stalemate is brought about when two or more states possess nuclear weapons and second strike capabilities are available to both states. This situation according to realists is a stable peaceful situation.

Peace can be defined simply by the Penguin Dictionary of International Relations as the ‘absence of war;’[5] this definition however can be interpreted in several ways. Kenneth Waltz is a realist theorist, who argues, in the case of nuclear weapons, the more states which possess them, the better international stability will become. Waltz’s understanding of peace assumes that since nuclear deterrence can result in the absence of war between major powers, nuclear threats can be seen to provide security and maintain peace.[6]

Those which oppose deterrence theory believe that ‘nuclear optimists who believed in nuclear deterrence theory, had not taken into account the stability- instability paradox or a proxy war.’[7] Known as nuclear pessimists[8] these theorists believe that a simple absence of war is not sufficient to deserve the title of peace. If peace cannot be understood by the absence of war as realists would claim, what is real peace? The closest explanation of this term can be found in Glen Williams’s work, ‘real peace implies much more than disarmament peace implies a sense of deep wellbeing – individually and collectively. It arises from relationships of trust, mutual acceptance and support that enable people to develop their full human potential.’[9] Although this may appear to be a very idealistic definition, peace after all is an ideal situation. Using this definition it is clear that a nuclear stalemate would not constitute peace since it relies upon the use of threat and imposition of fear to be effective. Deterrence then must be understood as the absence of war but at the same time the absence of peace, a middle ground broadly described as a non-war condition of world politics.[10]

Deterrence pessimists raise the question of proxy wars as an indicator of how nuclear deterrence fails to provide a stable peaceful environment. ‘Its been a strange sort of “peace” since August 6^th 1945, when a small atomic bomb killed 140,000 people in Hiroshima we’ve seen about 150 wars fought with conventional weapons, killing some 30 million people.’[11] Such attacks highlight the fact that although proxy wars can be seen to reduce the likelihood of war between great powers, they still produce millions of casualties. Although the deaths brought about through proxy wars would probably not compare to the casualties resulting from another world war, making them appear preferable, it seems impossible to claim that nuclear deterrence creates peace in the international system. While millions of people die as an indirect result of the nuclear deterrence game fighting proxy wars funded and initiated by states suffering a nuclear stalemate we are far from a state of peace.

A common criticism of nuclear deterrence theory is also a critique of the realist assumption that states are rational actors. ‘Many believe that decisions to go to war are often the result of misperception, misunderstanding, miscalculation and errors of judgement.’[12] As John Garnett points out wars can occur by mistake. If one is convinced by this argument then the prospect of a nuclear stalemate situation becomes a scary thought. If two countries have the capabilities to destroy one another even after sustaining an initial attack and a mistake is made, then it is highly likely that both countries could face destruction. Garnett suggests there are many situations which can lead to a mistaken war and that the majority are due to lack of communication or poor intelligence between states. Poor information of an enemy’s capabilities or intentions can lead to incorrect judgements of the balance of power between states and a failure to properly recognise the risks of ones actions.[13] In such situations a nuclear stalemate environment is argued to create greater risk to survival since mistakes could be so severe, or escalate sufficient to warrant the launch of a nuclear weapon by either side.

The closest example of a near nuclear exchange resulting from misperception which involved a questionable error of judgement was the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962. During this crisis the United States and Soviet Union almost came to blows after ten years of relatively peaceful nuclear stalemate. The soviet decision to upset the nuclear balance which existed, by establishing a missile base on Cuban soil, within close proximity of America, was arguably an error in judgement on behalf of the Soviets. Jeffrey Record argues that the soviets were attempting to regain some of the lead which the United States enjoyed in technical superiority through the acquisition of a strategic base thus compensating their inferior weapons.[14] This was seen be Americans’ as an aggressive move and they responded by blockading access to Cuba and threatening invasion of the island unless construction was halted and the base removed.[15] Because of misunderstandings of the soviets intentions and miscalculation of the American response to the situation the two Superpowers almost initiated what could have easily become a nuclear war. If mistakes can lead to nuclear exchange between the worlds largest superpowers how can we be assured that states which lack the decision making process and intelligence systems of these two great powers will not decided to use their nuclear weapons. Although the Cuban Crisis did not end with the use of nuclear weapons lessons should be learned, that states will continue to take advantage of perceived opportunities despite an enemy’s use of nuclear deterrence.

Another criticism of nuclear deterrence is closely linked with the afore mentioned misperception problem. Human error or fallibility is identified as a major problem with nuclear deterrence strategy. There are many points in the decision to launch a nuclear weapon at which simple human error, or where individual judgement or assessment could result in an incorrectly informed decision to start a nuclear war. Firstly as Jeffrey record explains ‘The foundation of successful deterrence is the deterrees conviction that the deterrer means what he says.’[16] This first example allows for two human errors to be made, firstly the deterree could fail to believe the threat and mistakenly dismiss the chance of a nuclear retaliation for their desired action. Alternatively the deterrer might not convey a sufficiently convincing deterrence threat, in this case the nuclear deterrence could fail finding the deterrer under attack prompting the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort. In either case the human factor is the variable, it is this problem which belief systems theorists claim to be the problem behind nuclear weapons.[17] According to the belief systems approach human beliefs, values and opinions of rational behaviour vary between countries and cultures which supported by evidence offers a compelling argument against the existence of a nuclear stalemate.[18]

Tanya White goes further to suggest that in certain stressful situations where the stakes are large, for example crisis situations, the application of a simplified image of reality can occur within decision making circles.[19] Often considerations between a small number of options can result in the rejection of any other solution which doesn’t fit with an already established view of the situation. Failure to acknowledge other options or information can in turn result in a misinformed decision to go to war. This again is unacceptable in a nuclear stalemate situation where incorrect decisions could result in total destruction of entire states and their populations.

Although we have heard several convincing arguments which suggest nuclear deterrence is a very dangerous strategy it would be ignorant to simply dismiss deterrence as a process for preventing the breakout of war. Neo-realists, firm advocates of deterrence theory, recognise that nuclear weapons do come with various risk, however, they believe that if a state can be prevented from acting in a certain way in effect avoiding the breakout of war through threat of massive retaliation, then extended periods of peace may be sustainable. Waltz in his paper The Spread of nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better makes it clear that nuclear deterrence is not an ideal form of peace but argues it allows for the sustainable absence of war between states which possess nuclear strike capabilities. [20] Despite hearing many critiques of the process attacking its instability, history seems to supports Waltz’s claims since despite huge ideological differences total war never broke out between America and the Soviet Union, even after sixty years of open hostility.

An important counter argument worth noting is raised by advocates of deterrence theory, that is nuclear weapons cannot be un-invented and so in a world of military atomic knowledge it is preferable to have strong nuclear deterrence to ensure security from possible enemies wishing to harness this knowledge.[21] Although this is a very pessimistic argument it raises an important issue; if the entire world disarmed their nuclear capabilities it could be possible for a rogue state, individual terrorist groups, or various other actors to somehow acquire a nuclear weapon. If this happened there would be no credible nuclear deterrence to prevent the rogue actor having great power over the rest of the world. It is precisely these fears which are at the centre of most nuclear states decisions not to disarm.

So what does the future hold for the use of nuclear deterrence? Since the end of the Cold War and more recently in the aftermath of the September 11^th attacks it has become apparent that the state must no longer concentrate their security efforts solely in preventing attacks from other states. The emergence of terrorism as the most prominent fear of a large amount of national leader’s world wide could have a dramatic impact upon nuclear deterrence as an ultimate security strategy. Because international terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda are vastly dispersed throughout the globe, operating in networks within both friendly and hostile countries, the credibility of nuclear deterrence could be seen to be compromised. These actors have no territorial homeland and so it can be suggested that the use of nuclear weapons would be dismissed as a possible source of retaliation to any organised attack. A similar argument might also be applied in the case of small rogue or pariah states such as North Korea. Because of the geographically small size of North Korea and its close proximity to a strategic ally of the United States, South Korea, would a North Korean attack upon America result in an equal nuclear retaliation? Even if a small enough bomb could be prepared, assuming regular nuclear warheads have the power to eliminate North Korea as well as damaging surrounding countries, would the neighbouring ally not dissuade the United States from launching? Jeffrey record dismisses these claims asserting that ‘evidence strongly suggests that credible nuclear deterrence remains effective against rogue states use of WMD’[22]

The future looks bleak for the strategic relevance of nuclear deterrence in the face of new global dangers. If rogue states can be controlled by a nuclear deterrence or stalemate situation , there is still the issue of terrorism and war by mistake, both of which become much more deadly in nuclear stalemate situations either through risk of nuclear weapons or technology theft, or through the increase risk of nuclear war. So what are the alternatives? Neo realists argue a defensive ideal would be a much better situation, deterrence pessimists argue for real peace, however both suggestions seem very difficult, almost impossible to achieve in today’s International political climate. According to Jeffrey Record’s article in Policy Analysis 2004 the only substitute for deterrence is preventative or pre-emptive war[23]. His article suggests that when faced with new dangers which cannot be dealt with under their second strike deterrence policy, the United States has seriously considered preventative war as an alternative system to protect America from catastrophic attack[24]. Exemplified by the Iraq War 2004, the preventative war strategy, works on the understanding that if an enemy or perceived threat posses an imminent danger of attack they must be prevented from doing so by force. If record is correct in his assessment, and preventative war is considered as a likely substitute for deterrence strategy, then even nuclear pessimists might agree deterrence is favourable to the alternative. An unstable stalemate which limits the breakout of total war should be favourable to a policy of attacking on the assumption that an enemy might strike first.

To conclude, in answer to the question, is the stalemate situation brought about by deterrence real peace? The compelling argument posed by various authors who suggest peace is dependant upon positive attributes such as trust and mutual acceptance lead us to believe a negative policy based upon the threat of annihilation falls short of a peaceful situation. At best deterrence offers a temporary solution to prevent the outbreak of war between major powers which possess nuclear capabilities while at the same time shifting conflict and aggression in the form of proxy wars, to various parts of the world. Realists believe that nuclear deterrence is the best policy for the anarchic system in the post atomic age. On this point I must agree with realists since the atomic genie is out of the bottle it necessary to protect ones self from the possible use of nuclear weapons. Aided with intercontinental missiles, they are almost impossible to stop, therefore the best protection is the ability to strike back and to use this ability to deter a would be attacker from striking first. The likelihood of preventative war becoming a substitute policy only adds to the sense of security enjoyed in an era of nuclear balance coupled with the historical fact that war has yet to break out between nuclear powers suggests that although peace by deterrence is unobtainable the absence of war is much more preferable to the existence of war.

Bibliography

Calvocoressi, Peter, World Politics 1945-2000, (Pearson Education Limited, 2001)

Evans Graham, and Hewham, Jeffrey, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, (Penguin Books, 1998)

Garnett, John, The causes of war and conditions of Peace, ed. John Baylis et al, Strategy in the Contemporary World.)

Krepon, Michael, The stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and escalation Control in South Asia, (The Henry L. Stimson Center, May 2003)

Malik, General V P, Limited war and Escalaton Control, (Peace and Conflict, December 2004, vol. 17 #10)

Ogilvie-White, Tanya, Is there a Thoery of Nuclear Proliferation? An analysis of the contemporary Debate, (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1996), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol04/41/ogilvi41.pdf

Record, Jeffrey, Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation, (Policy Analysis, July 8^th, 2004, #516)

Waltz, Kenneth, More may be better, published in, Scott D. Sagan, Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons a debate renewed, (W. W. Norton and Company, 2003)

Williams, Glen, The suicide pact: how to break it, (New Internationalist, March 1983, #121), http://www.newint.org/issue121/keynote.htm

The Conference of Defence Associations, CDA Standing Submission to the House of Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade Regarding Canada’s Policy on Nuclear Weapons, (The Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa, Ontario, February 17, 1998)